Full quantum capability devices can provide secure communications, but they are challenging to make portable given the current technology. Besides, classical portable devices are unable to construct communication channels resistant to quantum computers. Hence, communication security on portable devices cannot be guaranteed. Semi-Quantum Key Distribution (SQKD) and Semi-Quantum Direct Communication (SQDC) attempt to break the quandary by lowering the receiver's required quantum capability so that secure communications can be implemented on a portable device. However, all SQKD and SQDC protocols have low qubit efficiency and complex hardware implementations. The protocols involving quantum entanglement require linear Entanglement Preservation Time (EPT) and linear quregister size. In this paper, we propose two new no-key SQDC protocols that address the aforementioned weaknesses. They are named Economic No-key SQDC (ENKSQDC) and Rate Estimation ENKSQDC (RENKSQDC). They achieve theoretically constant minimal EPT and quregister size, regardless of message length. We show that the new protocols, with low overhead, can detect Measure and Replay Attacks (MRAs). RENKSQDC is tolerant to transmission impairments and environmental perturbations. The protocols are based on a new quantum message transmission operation termed Tele-Conjure. Like QKD, their strength depends on physical principles rather than mathematical complexity.
Background
We start this section by introducing the notations. Since our new protocol heavily relies on the Bell states and Bell measurement, we briefly review them first. We also introduce MRAs and the corresponding detection algorithm (MRAD), which is used in our new protocol to guarantee the data transmission security.
In this paper, we use lowercase English letters to represent classical bits (cbits) and Greek letters to represent qubits. Besides, bold English capital letters denote Bell states. A sequence of cbits is denoted by an uppercase English letter with a tilde underneath. For instance, M = m 1 m 2 · · · m ι is a cbit string of length ι.
Bell states and Bell measurement
The Bell states are considered the simplest example of entanglement. There are four Bell states: |Φ + = If λ A λ B is not a Bell state, it is projected into a Bell state (according to the quantum measurement projection rule). In particular, we list the cases when input λ A λ B equals |00 , |01 , |10 or |11 in Table 1 . 
Measure and Replay Attack and the detection method
The replay attack is a classical network threat in which the adversary Eve replays a message in a context different from the original and expected context, therefore tricking the honest listener(s) into believing it has completed the protocol execution successfully [17] . In a quantum network, a similar attack can be perpetrated. Suppose Eve can intercept the quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob and measure any qubit in it. While Alice sends qubits to Bob through the channel, Eve measures the qubits using the Z-basis (|0 , |1 ) and sends new qubits to Bob according to the measurement results (if the result is zero, Eve sends |0 ; else, she sends |1 ). Since Eve needs to measure the qubits before replaying them, the attack is called the Measure and Replay Attack (MRA) [11] .
The following procedure shows how we detect MRAs using the Bell state entanglement property and Bell measurement. The idea is also used in the Luo and Hwang's protocol [10] and inherited by the Almousa and Barbeau's protocol [11] .
MRA Detection (MRAD): ). Eve perpetrates an MRA, by measuring λ B and getting the result r = 0. At the same moment, λ A collapses to |0 because of the entanglement. Eve sends the corresponding qubit (|0 ) to Bob, which is reflected back to Alice.
Alice performs a Bell measurement on the qubit pair consisting of λ A and the received |0 . Since λ A has collapsed to |0 , the input to the circuit is λ A λ B = |00 . According to Table 1 , there is 50% probability of getting b 1 b 2 = 00 (conclude that the input is |Φ + according to the criterion in Section 2.1, a false negative) as well as to get b 1 b 2 = 10 (conclude that the input is |Φ − , a true positive).
From the example, if Alice gets i = 0 and Eve obtains the measurement result r = 0, then Alice has 50% probability of concluding that there is no MRA, though it was performed. The same conclusions are drawn for all the combinations of i and r according to Table 1 . Therefore, we get the following lemma and theorem. Lemma 1. Given that the checking bit is attacked, the probability that MRAD detects an MRA is 50% . Theorem 1. If Alice and Bob repeat MRAD n times, then there is 1 − 1 2 n probability of detecting MRAs given that n checking bits are attacked.
n Remark 1. MRAD essentially checks whether the checking bits sent by Alice are measured by anybody else, but it cannot tell who measures it. It can detect MRAs only when Alice knows Bob does not measure any checking bits. Therefore, if there is any measurement detected, it must be an attack.
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Since we apply the mapping rule in Step M1 and the operation in Step M5 again in the later discussion, we define them as follows.
Definition 1 (Mapping to Bell states (F), Step 1). Given a cbit i, function F : {0, 1} → {|Φ + , |Ψ − } is defined by: F(0) = |Φ + , and F(1) = |Ψ − .
Remark 2. Notice that F is bijective. Therefore, given the output sequence consisting of instances |Φ + and |Ψ − , we can use F −1 to get the original qubit sequence I.
Definition 2 (Alice Verifies (AV), Step 5) . Given b 1 , b 2 , i ∈ {0, 1}, we define function AV (b 1 , b 2 , i) : {0, 1} 3 → {0, 1} by:
Note that 0 → no attack detected, and 1 → attack detected.
New Protocol
In this section, we propose a new SQDC protocol called Economic No-Key Semi-Quantum Direct Communication (ENKSQDC). We start the discussion with an introduction to a data transmission protocol called SBP, which is a building block of ENKSQDC (not self-contained). Assuming that there are no MRAs, we show that SBP is secure (Theorem 2). In the design of SBP, Bell measurement seems redundant. It is intended for sharing the quantum circuit with MRAD (Remark 3). The considerable benefits of this design are discussed in Section 5. To meet the assumption of Theorem 2, we integrate MRAD and SBP to get ENKSQDC. If we assume that ENKSQDC detects all MRAs, then it is provably secure (Theorem 4).
Single-Bit Protocol (SBP)
Protocol 1 (SBP). Alice sends a single cbit d ∈ {0, 1} to Bob. The protocol needs a bidirectional quantum channel and a bidirectional public classical channel. It runs in the following way: S1 Alice generates a random cbit i and then set a Bell state B = F(i) (Definition 1). Let λ A denote the first qubit of B and λ B the second.
S2 Alice retains λ A and sends λ B to Bob.
S3 Bob measures the qubit λ B in the Z-basis to obtain a cbit r B (at the same moment, λ A collapses due to the entanglement with λ B ). Simultaneously, he sends a pre-generated qubit λ * B = |0 back to Alice and notifies Alice that λ B has been measured through the classical channel. S4 Alice performs a Bell measurement on the qubit pair |λ A λ * B = |λ A 0 (λ A is retained in Step S1) and obtains b 1 and b 2 . S5 According to Table 1 , if b 1 b 2 = 00 or 10, then λ A was |0 . If b 1 b 2 = 01 or 11, then λ A was |1 . Pairing λ A with the Bell state B she chose (recorded by i) in Step S1, she determines the value of r B measured by Bob in Step S3. In particular, she uses the following rule:
S6 If r B = d, Alice notifies Bob, through the classical channel, that r B is the right value. Otherwise, Alice notifies Bob to take the complement of r B .
Remark 3. The pre-generated qubit λ * B = |0 in Step S3 is unnecessary to implement SBP. So is the Bell measurement in Step S4. In fact, in Step S3, Bob only needs to notify Alice that he has measured λ B , and, in Step S4, Alice simply uses the Z-basis to get the value of λ A . Here, we intendedly implement SBP with redundant operations so that the new protocol (ENKSQDC, introduced in Section 3.2) can use one fixed quantum circuit to implement both the attack detection (MRAD) and data transmission (SBP) protocols. We discuss the design and its benefits in details in Section 3.2, and more performance analysis is made in Section 5.
In the sequel, we use the operations introduced in Steps S5 and S6. We refer to them as a function and an operation. In
Step S5, Alice determines r B owned by Bob without communication. We call this function Tele-Conjure.
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Definition 3 (Tele-Conjure). Given b 1 , b 2 and i (Step S1), function Tele-Conjure TC(b 1 , b 2 , i) → {0, 1} returns the value of r B according to Step S5.
Besides, for the operation in Step S6, Alice corrects Bob's measurement results. Thence, we call this operation Correct. Proof. We assume that there is no MRA. So, we essentially assume that Steps S1 to S3 are always secure (Bob only sends a confirmation in Step S3). There is no communication in Step S4 and S5. In the last step, Alice sends a confirmation irrelevant to the value of datum d, which implies Step S6 is also secure. Therefore, we conclude that SBP is secure.
Operation 1 (Correct
Remark 4. Theorem 2 depends on the assumption that the classical channel is authentic. While Alice and Bob exchange information, it is necessary to check that they are truly communicating with each other and their public messages are not modified. In other words, they need resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks.
According to Theorem 2, we can say SBP is secure only if there is no MRA, however, which cannot be detected by SBP itself. Thence, a corresponding detection mechanism should be added. In particular, if we use MRAD to guarantee there is no MRA, then we can use SBP to transmit data securely according to Theorem 2. With this preliminary idea in mind, we derive the following protocol:
Economic No-Key Semi-Quantum Direct Communication (ENKSQDC)
We use the hardware of SBP. Specifically, Alice and Bob are connected by a quantum bidirectional channel and a public classical bidirectional channel. We define four operations requiring quantum resources in the new protocol.
Operation 2 (Alice sends). Suppose that this is the k th transmission by Alice. Alice randomly generates a cbit and stores it in a register i k . Alice generates a Bell state F(i), retains its first qubit λ kA and sends the second λ kB to Bob.
Operation 3 (Bob measures). When Bob receives the k th qubit sent by Alice, he measures it to get s k . Simultaneously, he sends a pre-generated qubit |0 to Alice. Moreover, he records the fact that the k th qubit he received is measured.
Operation 4 (Bob reflects). Bob reflects the k th qubit sent by Alice back without measurement. Besides, he also records the fact that the k th qubit he received is reflected. Step E2 before reindexing.
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E6 Since Bob measures m qubits, then if Alice puts all c k 's in one string, she has C = c 1 c 2 · · · c m (after reindexing in the original order). Note that C equals S , which is owned by Bob.
E7 For k = 1, 2, · · · , m, Alice and Bob perform Operation 1 with inputs g k , c k and s k . Then Bob gets the message from Alice.
It is worth noting that, Steps E1 to E3 are not performed sequentially but in parallel. Because of this design, Alice only needs a small constant number of quregisters and preserves entanglement for a short and fixed length of time (we discuss this highlight in details in Section 5.1).
The protocol essentially lets Alice and Bob share a random m-bit binary string (Steps E1 to E6) S (= C ), which can be considered as a shared key too. In other words, the protocol can be considered as a key distribution protocol between a full quantum capability sender and a classical receiver. With the shared binary string, Alice then can send a message to Bob by performing Operation 1. To amortize the shared key establishment cost, Alice and Bob can repeat Step E7 to transfer several messages before updating the shared string S (= C ) (by repeating Steps E1 to E6).
The ENKSQDC protocol is a hybrid of SBP and MRAD. The operations of Alice in the first four steps are exactly the same (see Figure 2) . Since all the quantum operations of SBP and MRAD are performed in the first four steps, Alice can use a single quantum circuit to complete the first four steps of the two protocols without knowing which one she is actually following. In Figure 2 , we put the first four steps of SBP and MRAD together and label the operations with the step numbers used to introduce them. Besides, we also provide the corresponding step numbers of the ENKSQDC protocol. It is worth noting that, Steps E1 to E3 are not performed sequentially but in parallel. Because of this design, Alice only needs to have a small constant number of quregisters and to preserve entanglement for a short and fixed length of time (we discuss this highlight in details in Section 5.1).
E5 After receiving P from
The protocol essentially lets Alice and Bob share a random m-bit binary string (Steps E1 to E6) S (= C ), which can be considered as a shared key too. In other words, the protocol can be considered as a key distribution protocol between a full quantum capability sender and a classical receiver. With the shared binary string, Alice then can send the message to Bob by performing Operation 1. To improve the transmission efficiency, Alice and Bob can repeat Step E7 to transfer more messages before updating the shared string S (= C ) (by repeating Steps E1 to E6).
The ENKSQD protocol is a hybrid of SBP and MRAD. The operations of Alice in the first four steps are exactly same (see Figure 2) . Since all the quantum operations of SBP and MRAD are performed in the first four steps, Alice can use a single quantum circuit to complete the first four steps of the two protocols without knowing which one she is actually following. In Figure 2 , we put the first four steps of SBP and MRAD together and label the operations with the step numbers when introducing them. Besides, we also provide the corresponding step numbers of the ENKSQD protocol. We can observe that the only difference between SBP and MRAD is the operation made by Bob. In other words, Bob decides which protocol is being implemented. Specifically, Bob decides the protocol being applied by either measuring λ kB (sending a pre-generated |0⟩ simultaneously) or reflecting it. If λ kB is measured, then it is a data bit for delivering messages (implementing SBP); otherwise, it is a checking bit for detecting MRAs (implementing MRAD).
After Alice and Bob complete the first three steps in ENKSQD, Bob sends a message through the classical channel to notify Alice of the qubits either he measured or reflected. According to the message, Alice chooses the proper classical operations either to detect MRAs (MRAD) or to determine the measurement results of Bob (SBP). 
Security Analysis of ENKSQD
The ENKSQD and SBP protocols share the same assumption -the public channel must be authentic for the same reason (see Remark 2). We can observe that the only difference between SBP and MRAD is the operation made by Bob. In other words, Bob decides which protocol is being implemented. Specifically, Bob decides the protocol being applied by either measuring λ kB (sending a pre-generated |0 simultaneously) or reflecting it. Note that the pre-generation of the |0 , instead of generating it on demand, secures ENKSQDC against the delay and reflection attacks [11] . If λ kB is measured, then it is a data bit for delivering messages (implementing SBP); otherwise, it is a checking bit for detecting MRAs (implementing MRAD).
After Alice and Bob complete the first three steps in ENKSQDC, Bob sends a message through the classical channel to notify Alice of the qubits either he measured or reflected. According to the message, Alice chooses the proper classical operations either to detect MRAs (MRAD) or to determine the measurement results of Bob (SBP).
Remark 5. Since Bob determines the protocol being implemented by choosing Measure or Reflect, then in ENKSQDC, Bob chooses Measure m times and Reflect r times; therefore, SBP and MRAD are run m and r times respectively.
Security analysis of ENKSQDC
The ENKSQDC and SBP protocols share the same assumption -the public channel must be authentic for the same reason (see Remark 4) . According to Remark 5, ENKSQDC can be thought as a combination of m SBPs and r MRADs. MRAD is used to detect MRAs. Thence, it secures SBP (see Theorem 2) . According to Theorem 1, the probability of detecting MRAs is 1 − 1 2 n , where n is the number of MRAD applied. Therefore, in the ENKSQDC protocol, since MRAD is performed r times, the detection success rate is 1 − 1 2 r when Eve perpetrates MRAs on all qubits sent by Alice. Assuming that there is a specific probability that the adversary Eve attacks the qubits sent by Alice, we have the following theorem.
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with probability p. Bob measures m qubits and reflects r qubits (checking bits). Then the probability that Alice detects an MRA is
Proof. Let N denote the number of checking bits (that is, the bits reflected by Bob) attacked by Eve. Since for each checking bit, Eve has probability p of attacking it; therefore, N follows a binomial distribution with the number of experiments r and success rate p. Let A be an indicator of the detection result. A = 1 means there is an attack detected while A = 0 means no attack detected. Then the probability that Alice detects an MRA is the expectation of A. So we have,
(Law of total probability)
It is worth noting that if we let p = 1, then Eve measures all the qubits sent by Alice. The probability that Alice detects an attack is E(A)
r , which is consistent with the observation at the beginning of Section 3.3. Figure 3 plots the detection success rate according to the function given in Theorem 3 where r ranges from zero to 15 with different probabilities p. We also add our simulation results (the points) in the figure for comparison. The points on a curve of a given color have the same probability p, indicated in the legend. The simulation results and Theorem 3 are consistent. We can observe that the detection success rate converges to one faster with a larger p. The observation makes sense since a higher attack rate implies that more checking bits are affected on average, which results in an increase of the detection success rate. A similar conclusion can be drawn if we increase the number of checking bits, that is, variable r. Assuming that MRAs are always detectable, then we can conclude that the ENKSQDC protocol is secure.
Theorem 4. Given that MRAs are always detectable, the ENKSQDC protocol is secure.
Proof. When an attack is detected, Alice and Bob abort the transmission. The message is secure. Otherwise, according to the
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assumption, there is no MRA. Remark 5 states that the protocol essentially implements SBP m times for transmitting an m-bit message from Alice to Bob. Combined with Theorem 2, the ENKSQDC protocol is secure against any network attack.
Rate Estimation ENSQDC (RENKSQDC)
ENKSQDC detects MRAs and is secure assuming no hardware fault nor environmental disturbance that destroy entanglement. So far, we ignored them for the sake of simplicity. They do exist in practice. Ignoring them produces false positives and incorrect protocol terminations. In this section, we enhance the detection part of the protocol to fix this issue. Destructions of entanglement involving checking bits may result in Positive MRADs (PMs) whose probability is denoted by ρ and estimated by its rateρ := Number of PMs Number of checking bits .
The destructions have two types. In particular, we say that a qubit is disturbed if the entanglement involving it is destroyed due to a hardware imperfection or an environmental disturbance. If the destruction of the entanglement is caused by an eavesdropper Eve, we say the qubit is attacked. We show that two timesρ is an estimatorκ of the probability κ that a checking bit is disturbed or attacked. Let ω denote the probability that a qubit is disturbed. If ω is unknown, we can estimate it ahead of the protocol execution assuming that Eve does not perpetrate attacks. As no qubits are attacked during the estimation, κ is reduced to ω. Correspondingly,κ is reduced toω, an estimator of ω. During the execution of the protocol, the attacks perpetrated by Eve increase κ and cause its deviation from ω. By monitoring the difference between κ and ω, we gauge the existence of attacks and thus the security of the protocol. We use the following symbols and facts for the statistical analysis in the sequel. Let B(n, p) be a binomial distribution with n ∈ N trials and success rate p ∈ [0, 1], N(µ, σ 2 ) a normal distribution with mean µ ∈ R and variance σ 2 andX the arithmetic mean of X. Remark 6. We call B(1, p) a Bernoulli distribution with the success rate p.
Remark 7. Random Variables of binomial distributions can be added if they have the same success rate. In particular, if X ∼ B(n, p) and Y ∼ B(m, p), then X +Y ∼ B(n + m, p) [18] .
follows a standard normal distribution. Namely,
Fact 2. Suppose X ∼ N(µ X , σ 2 X ) and n ∈ R + . Then,
. Theorem 5 discusses the random processes in the detection of disturbed and attacked qubits. Otherwise, the checking bit is intact which implies that the result must be negative. Namely, P[D i = 1|A i = 0] = 0. By Law of total probability, 
8/16
Remark 9. A binomial distribution B(n, p) can be approximated by a normal distribution with the same mean and variance if n ≥ max [19] . Therefore, the binomial distribution C ρ ∼ B(r, . Theorem 6 provides a method to estimate the parameter p of a Bernoulli distribution [18] . r . Therefore, κ can be estimated bŷ
Remark 9 states that . Applying Fact 2 again, we have κ ∼ N κ,
Rate difference monitoring
When ω is unknown, we need to estimate it before starting the execution of the protocol. We have to assume that during this estimation, there is no attack. Under this assumption, κ is reduced to ω, the probability that a checking bit is disturbed. Correspondingly,κ is reduced to an estimator of ω. Namely, κ = ω andκ =ω. As we have shown κ ∼ N κ,
, we also haveω ∼ N ω,
, where s is the number of checking bits for estimating ω. Let C ρ denote the number of PMs under the assumption that the checking bits are not attacked. By replacing C ρ by C ρ and s by r in equation (1), we get,
In RENKSQDC, the attack detection method is implemented by checking that κ = ω. After getting the estimations of κ and ω, let e denote their difference, which is an outcome of r.v. E =κ −ω. Fact 3 states that E still follows a normal distribution. In particular, E ∼ N κ − ω,
Under the null hypothesis H 0 that there is no attack, κ = ω.
Then E ∼ N 0, 2ν 1 − . So, if H 0 is true, the distribution of r.v. E is condensed near zero. Although the set of the possible outcomes of E is R, the test can rule out outcomes that are much greater than zero without introducing much error (note that we do not consider a negative difference because κ is, theoretically, not less than ω. In other words, the alternative hypothesis H 1 is κ > ω). Let α denote the probability that an outcome of E is much greater than zero and ruled out by the test. We can test H 0 against H 1 by rejecting H 0 if we observe an outcome of E greater than e α , where e α ∈ R such that P(E > e α ) = α. In other words, the protocol is considered insecure if e, the difference between the estimations of κ and ω, is greater than e α .
The arduous calculation of e α can be avoided if we scale E to
a standard normal distribution according to Fact 1. So correspondingly, the difference e after scaling (denoted by z) is an outcome of Z. Then an equivalent test can be made by rejecting H 0 if z > z α where z α ∈ R such that P(Z > z α ) = α. The table listing the value of z α as a function of α can be found in Reference [18] . Therefore, we amend the original ENKSQDC protocol as follows:
Protocol 3 (RENKSQDC).
RE1 (Estimation of ω)
Alice and Bob execute MRAD s times. Alice sends s qubits to Bob. He reflects all of them. In other words, there are s checking bits and zero data bits. In Step E5, Alice counts the number of PMs (denoted by C ρ ). Finally, she uses equation (2) to estimate ω. Note that during the estimation process, we need to guarantee that Eve does not perpetrate attacks.
RE2 Alice and Bob start the execution of the protocol. They do Steps E1-E4.
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RE3 In E5, instead of terminating the protocol when p k = 0 and function AV (b 1k , b 2k , i k ) = 1, Alice increments a counter C ρ (initial value is zero) and continues to check the remaining bits of P . After finishing checking, she uses equation (1) to estimate κ. We test the null hypothesis H 0 : κ = ω against the alternative hypothesis H 1 : κ > ω, equation (3) . If H 0 is rejected, Alice considers the protocol is insecure and terminates it; otherwise, Alice and Bob execute Steps E6 and E7 to complete the data transmission.
When ω is given, we can simply compare it with the estimation of κ. Similarly, we need to test H 0 : κ = ω against H 1 : κ > ω. Since ω is not estimated but a given constant, we can sayω ∼ N(ω, 0). We estimate the real attack rate κ by equation (1) . Applying Fact 3, we have that E =κ − ω =κ −ω ∼ N κ − ω,
Under the assumption that H 0 is true,
. Applying Fact 1, we scale E to Z = (κ−ω)−0
∼ N(0, 1). Let z denote the scaled difference of the estimated κ and the pre-known ω, which is an outcome of Z . We reject H 0 if z > z α , where the definition of z α is unchanged.
Since ω is given, its estimation is unnecessary. To complete the data transmission, Alice and Bob only need to implement Steps RE2 and RE3, where Z is replaced by Z .
Security analysis of RENKSQDC
As we have mentioned at the beginning of this section, the original MRAD fails if the qubits transmitted are disturbed and the entanglement is destroyed. The false positives mislead the protocol about the transmission security and cause wrong termination. To fix the problem, in Sections 4.1, we propose a new detection method for MRAs based on a statistical test. The method detects the discrepancy between ω and κ, which does not exist if there is no attack. If any significant discrepancy is identified, the protocol is considered insecure and terminated.
The test rules out the possible outcomes of E that are largely greater than zero, and thus, introduces detection errors. In more details, suppose that Eve does not perpetrate attacks, which implies κ = ω and the null hypothesis H 0 is true. Due to the fluctuation of the estimator D, the difference betweenκ andω, there is a proabability α that the sampling of D is greater than the threshold d α and gets the H 0 rejected, which is a false positive. Correspondingly, if Eve perpetrates attacks and causes κ > ω, it is also possible that H 0 is not rejected since their difference is still less than d α , which is a false negative. We formally define these two types of errors as follows, Definition 4 (Type A Error -False Negative). Eve perpetrates an attack, but the protocol is wrongly considered secure.
Definition 5 (Type B Error -False Positive). Eve does not perpetrate an attack, but the protocol is wrongly considered insecure.
The Type A Error has more adverse consequences than the Type B Error because Eve can eavesdrop the message without the awareness of Alice and Bob. We show that the probability of undetected eavesdropping is very low, even when a small number of checking bits is used. The Type B error does not undermine the security of the protocol. Instead, it lowers the transmission efficiency. While Eve does not perpetrate an attack, the Type B error causes a wrong belief of its presence and a termination of the protocol. The protocol needs to restart and resend all qubits. The transmission efficiency is affected.
The choice of a specific value for α, the occurrence probability of the Type B Error, affects the one of the Type A Error. In particular, an increase of α pushes the value of d α to zero. Although Eve only attacks a few portion of the checking bits, the difference between κ and ω she introduces may still exceed the lowered d α and get H 0 rejected; therefore, the test becomes stricter and the occurrence probability of Type A Error decreases. Similarly, we can show that a decrease of α leads to an increase of Type A Error occurrence probability. Since the Type A and B Error occurrence probabilities have a negative relationship, if we increase α to enhance the security level, we get more Type B Errors and lower transmission efficiency. Conversely, to decrease the overhead, security is undermined.
With the results of simulations, Figure 4 plots the rates of the two types of errors as a function of α. For estimating the Type A Error occurrence probability, we set the probability p for Eve to attack a qubit to 10% for both cases, and the number of checking bits to estimate κ and ω (if unknown) to 600. Note that the configuration here is intended to make the Type A Error occurrence probability more sensitive to the choice of alpha, which is not typical in practical problems. We will talk about how the error occurrence probabilities behave with more common configurations in the sequel. Whether the value ω is known or not, the trends for both types are consistent with our analysis. When ω is given, the probability of the Type A Error is lower because the estimation of ω introduces more variance, which further amplifies the fluctuation of the estimation of the difference D = κ − ω. Regarding the Type B Error, we can observe that the rate roughly equals α which makes sense since it is an estimation of it.
Besides the occurrence probability α of the Type B Error, the numbers of checking bits required to estimate ω and κ are also related to the transmission efficiency. A larger number of checking bits contributes to a better estimation, but also has higher overhead. Attack Rate 60%
Type A Error Type B Error Figure 5 . Error rates and their 95% confidence intervals with respect to the number of checking bits when Eve has probability p = 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.6 to attack a qubit. (The probability ω that a qubit is disturbed is unknown. Simulation configuration:
number of checking bits and the attack rate. The probability (ω = 0.05) that a qubit is disturbed is unknown in Figure 5 but pre-known in Figure 6 . α is set to 0.05. In Figure 5 , the numbers of checking bits coincide for the estimation of ω and κ. Figure 6 . Error rates and their 95% confidence intervals with respect to the number of checking bits when Eve has probability p = 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.6 to attack a qubit. (The probability ω that a qubit is disturbed is known. Simulation configuration:
The two figures show that when Eve is more likely to attack a qubit, the detection success rate increases. If Eve only attacks a small proportion of qubits, her attacks do not significantly increase κ and thus are concealed by ω. However, in order to successfully eavesdrop messages, Eve should perpetrates attacks at a rate higher than 50%. When the probability of attacks is 60%, 60 checking bits are sufficient to avoid the Type A Error (when ω is unknown). If ω is given, then 40 checking bits can achieve the same security level.
Note that the Type B Error rate should be constant. In particular, its mean is theoretically equal to 5% as it is an estimation of α. However, while the estimated rate roughly stays around 5% in Figure 6 , a relatively considerable increase is observed in Figure 5 . The increase is due to a low number of checking bits. According to Remark 9, a good normal approximation requires a large sample size and to estimate both ω and κ, a even larger one is needed. Although, the approximation is not quite accurate when the checking bit number is small, a low level of Type A Error rate shows that it is good enough to secure the protocol.
Since the RENKSQDC and ENKSQDC protocols are the same except for the part that detects MRAs, Theorem 4 is also applicable to RENKSQDC. In particular, we have Theorem 7
Theorem 7. With a sufficient number of checking bits, the Type A Error can be avoided. So the RENKSQDC protocol is secure.
Quantum Resource Requirements and Transmission Efficiency
We discuss the performance of the ENKSQDC protocol with respect to the quantum resource requirements, qubit efficiency and quantum circuit complexity. Among all SQKD and SQDC protocols, we show that the ENKSQDC protocol has the highest qubit efficiency (almost 100%) with the simplest quantum circuits (without qubits permutation and measurement basis switch). Comparing to the protocols utilizing the quantum entanglements, we show that the ENKSQDC protocol reaches the theoretical minimum of the quregister size and the EPT among the SQKD and SQDC protocols.
Quantum resources requirements
In Section 3.2, we mentioned that Alice only needs constant quantum resources and fixed EPT to implement the protocol regardless of the length of the message m. In this section, we discuss the quantum resource requirements to implement the
12/16
protocol in more details. Since the revised version introduced in Section 4 does not change the hardware requirements, we discuss them together.
Alice and Bob iterate over all i k 's ∈ I to complete all the quantum operations. Therefore, the minimum quantum resource requirements to implement the protocol is the same as the one to implement a single quantum process QP k (see Figure 7) register to retain its first qubit. Besides, Operation 5 requires Alice to have a Bell measurement circuit. The protocol needs Alice to preserve the entanglement of the Bell states generated in Step E1 until she performs a Bell measurement on it (this is the case when Bob reflects the second qubit λ B . If Bob measures λ B , then EPT is shorter). Let us suppose that the time for qubits traveling from Alice to Bob, or the other way, is T . If we ignore the time for Bob to reflect qubits, then the EPT is 2T + P, where P is the processing time of Alice to send and receive the qubit λ B . Compared with Alice, Bob only needs the fundamental quantum capability. Specifically, he needs a mechanism to either reflect a qubit or measure it in the Z-basis. To sum up, in order to implement the protocol, the following minimum quantum capabilities are required: Alice: a single-bit quregister, a Bell state preparation circuit and a Bell measurement circuit. Bob: a mechanism to either reflect or measure (in the Z-basis) a qubit and a device to generate qubit |0 . Among SQDC and SQKD protocols that utilizes entanglements, Alice must create at least a pair of entangled qubits and send at least one of the qubits to Bob. Therefore, for containing a qubit, a single-bit quregister is necessary. For checking the potential attacks, Alice must do some quantum operations on the qubit pair consisting of the qubit she retained and the one reflected by Bob. So, the EPT is at least 2T + P. As the ENKSQDC reaches the theoretical lower bound, we conclude that, Theorem 8. Among SQDC and SQKD protocols that utilizes entanglements, the ENKSQDC protocol only requires theoretically minimal quregister size and EPT.
Transmission efficiency analysis
We assume that Alice and Bob update the shared string C (= S ) for each dialogue. That is, they always go through Step E1 to
Step E5 to update the shared binary string before they apply Step E6 and Step E7 to transfer data.
Regarding the original protocol, suppose Alice sends a message of length m to Bob. If Eve attacks qubits with certain probability p, then in order to eavesdrop efficiently, p has to be close enough to 1. We assume p = 60.0%, then if r = 15, according to Theorem 3, the detection success rate is higher than 99.5%. Besides, we can reach a much higher security level by adding a few extra checking bits. In usual cases, the length of the message m is supposed to be much greater than 15, which implies that the overhead due to the checking bits becomes negligible, so we will not consider the number of checking bits in the sequel. To transfer m-bit data, Alice needs to send m qubits to Bob, while Bob sends the same number of qubits back. So in total 2m qubits are transmitted. If the message is long enough, then the proportion of checking bits is negligible. So the qubit efficiency approaches 100%.
If we consider the possibility that a qubit is disturbed during the qubit transmission, we need to apply the rate estimation version of the protocol. If ω is unknown, we need around 60 checking bits to reach 99% detection success rate (assuming that α = 0.01, ω = 0.05), which is acceptable considering a much larger total number of qubits transmitted. If the rate is given, then the checking bits number can decrease to 30 (extra 20 checking bits can improve the success rate to almost 100%). Then the overhead from the checking bits is negligible. The major part of the overhead is from α, the probability to get Type B Error, which causes a full restart of the protocol. In average, α · 100% qubits transmitted are discarded due to the wrong conclusion that the protocol is insecure. If we choose α = 0.01 (which is big enough to secure the protocol), the overhead is only 1%.
Since Alice always performs Bell measurements, there is no need for her to have a capability to switch measurement bases. Moreover, the operations associated with one qubit transmitted by Alice are independent of the ones associated with the others (because Alice does not need to encrypt the message by a permutation, and Bob does not need to apply a reverse permutation to get the original data). Hence, if there is a single qubit transmission or measurement failure, only the operations related to the qubit are required to be re-performed, which potentially increases the transmission success rate and transmission efficiency.
In Table 2 , we make a detailed comparison with other typical SQKD and SQDC protocols. Note that the qubit efficiency
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(η) is calculated by η = Length of the message Number of qubits sent by Alice .
For the protocols in References [7] [8] [9] 20] , η depends on some parameters other than the length of the message n. For these protocols, we give an upper bound for η. Regarding RENKSQDC, η is calculated by choosing α = 0.01. Besides, in the protocol proposed by Li et al. [9] , the measurement basis switch is not required of Alice or Bob but delegated to a third full quantum capability computer Charlie.
Conclusion
A new SQDC protocol (called Economic No-Key Semi-Quantum Direct Communication) has been introduced in this paper.
Compared to other SQDC and SQKD protocols, our new protocol has much higher qubit efficiency (almost 100%) and simpler quantum circuits (not requiring switching measurement basis or permuting qubits). While other SQKD and SQDC protocols encrypting messages through entanglements requires at least linear EPT and linear size quregister, in our protocol, only Alice needs to have a constant size quregister (as low as one qubit) and maintain the entanglement of a pair of qubits for time 2T +C, where T is the time required by Alice and Bob to transmit a qubit to each other, and C is the one consumed by Alice to prepare, receive and measure the qubits. Among the protocols relying on quantum entanglements to encrypt messages, we show that both quregister size and EPT achieve the theoretical minimums. The new protocol does not need a pre-shared key. Instead, it uses the entanglement of qubits to share a random string between Alice and Bob, which is further used as a key to encrypt messages. Since the protocol can be attacked by MRAs, checking bits are used for implementing MRAD.
In our original protocol, according to Theorem 3, we showed that 15 checking bits are enough to have 99.5% attack detection success rate if we assume the adversary Eve has 60.0% probability of attacking a single qubit sent by Alice. A much better protocol security level can be reached by adding only a few extra bits (for example, 20 checking bits can achieve a detection success rate of 99.92%). If the message size is sufficiently long, then the qubit efficiency can reach almost 100%.
The rate estimation version, the protocol RENKSQDC, can function properly and correctly detect attacks perpetrated by Eve while the qubits may be disturbed during the transmission. We designed a test to monitor the difference of κ, the probability that a qubit is disturbed or attacked, and ω (estimated or pre-known), the probability that a qubit is disturbed. If the difference is significantly large, the protocol terminates. The simulation results show that 60 checking bits can push detection success rate to almost 100% (assuming that α = 0.05 and ω = 0.05) if ω is unknown. The number of checking bits can decrease to 40 and achieve the same success rate if ω is pre-known. If we assume that MRAs are always detectable, then our protocol is secure against network attacks (Theorems 4 and 7).
